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INSIDER TRADING: WHY TO COMMIT THE 
CRIME FROM A LEGAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PESPECTIVE 
Emily A. Malone* 
INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading,1 a crime that often involves the wealthy getting 
wealthier, is a behavior associated with cheating and greed.2 It is 
also a crime that is apparently difficult to deter.3 This phenomenon 
can be illustrated by exploring current events. Insider trading hit 
the newsstands again last year with the scandal involving the 
ImClone Systems Inc. corporation (“ImClone”) and celebrity 
businesswoman Martha Stewart.4 This note uses that example as an 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2004. 
1 Although not defined in any statute or regulation, for the purpose of this 
note insider trading is “the use of material, nonpublic information in trading the 
shares of a company . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 798 (7th ed. 1999). For 
the purpose of this note, only the distinct crime of inside trading will be 
analyzed. Other forms of white collar crime will not be addressed. 
2 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the connection between 
insider trading and behavior associated with cheating and greed). 
3 See discussion infra Part II (discussing why the normative and legal costs 
associated with insider trading fail to effectively deter the crime). 
4 See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 89 (2d ed. 1989) 
(listing prominent businessmen as defendants in the 1987 insider trading 
scandal: “a partner in Goldman Sachs; the Director of Kidder, Peabody; the head 
of risk arbitrage for Merrill Lynch; Vice Presidents from Paine Webber, E. F. 
Hutton, Kidder, Peabody, and Shearson Lehman Brothers . . .”); see also 
Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: An Autumnal Resolution: Give Martha 
a Break, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2002, at A23 (putting the coverage of Martha 
Stewart on par with impending war with Iraq). This scandal will be used in a 
hypothetical context as an illustration of the theories explored by this note. See 
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illustration of why people engage in the crime of insider trading 
and why the behavior is not being effectively deterred.5 
In Part I, this note examines how criminal causation theories 
apply to insider trading. Since insider trading is a crime limited to 
a particular kind of criminal, one who has achieved financial and 
social success, the causation model of rational choice is applied.6 
In Part II, this note, using the rational choice theory, weighs the 
potential benefits of illegal trading with inside information against 
potential costs from a psychological perspective. The potential 
costs are normative, social, and legal. The cost of violating social 
norms may be significant but, in the context of American culture, 
the normative costs of trading with inside information are low.7 In 
addition, the potential legal costs are examined and although found 
to be significant, they are rendered ineffective by their inability to 
adequately address the harms caused by insider trading and their 
failure to consistently punish all types of insider trading.8 This note 
suggests that people choose to engage in insider trading because 
the incentives to trade with inside information outweigh the 
deterrents. 
Confounding the problem of ineffective costs is the possibility 
of justification.9 A person that rationally chooses to commit the 
crime of insider trading can justify his behavior in three ways: 
                                                          
also infra Part II.A (discussing the facts of the Martha Stewart scandal). 
5 See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (stating a maximum jail term of ten years). 
Although Insider Trading may also incur civil and administrative liability, this 
note will discuss only the criminal aspect of insider trading. See THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 658-60 (4th ed. 2002) 
(discussing the various means of enforcement of securities laws). 
6 See infra note 24 and accompanying text (applying rational choice 
theory). 
7 See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (comparing the norms espoused by 
American culture and the traits that are associated with insider trading). 
8 See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the failure of the law to 
adequately address the harms of insider trading). The low legal costs fail to 
stimulate higher conformity to the normative costs. Id. 
9 Justification is used in this note to explain the internal process of 
rationalizing a crime. See infra Part III. This has, however, no bearing on 
justification as a legal defense. 
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believing that insider trading is not actually illegal, believing that it 
is not harming anyone, or simply refusing to accept responsibility 
for the trade.10 The justification can resolve any conflicts the 
person may feel about violating societal norms or breaking the law. 
Therefore, Part II concludes that the decision to trade on inside 
information is in fact a rational one. The potential benefits 
outweigh the potential costs, and any conflict felt by the behavior 
can be neutralized through justification. Finally, in Part III, this 
note posits that the most plausible solution for deterrence of insider 
trading is a clarification of the existing laws such that the legal cost 
of the crime can compensate for low normative barriers. 
I.  CRIMINAL CAUSATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading is committed by people who have achieved a 
certain amount of success in society.11 This is a necessary 
conclusion because by definition, an “inside” trader must have a 
close enough connection to the financial world to receive access to 
the information.12 This link is often through an elevated 
employment position in a corporation, the position as a financial or 
legal advisor, or through a social relationship with someone in an 
inside position.13 This point is exemplified by the insider trading 
scandals of the late 1980s involving prominent people and by the 
current allegations against Martha Stewart.14 In light of the 
                                                          
10 See infra Part III (discussing how more effective legal costs could deter 
insider trading). 
11 ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A 
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993) (defining the insider as someone who receives 
inside information through their employment, relationship with the company, or 
is tipped by others). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 116 (discussing the opportunity that executive officers, directors, 
and majority shareholders have for trading on inside information and depicting 
the stereotypical dissemination of inside information at the golf course). Printer 
employees also have contact with inside information. See Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (finding that printer who traded on inside 
information had no duty to abstain from the trade); infra Part II.B.3.a 
(discussing Chiarella). 
14 See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 89 (discussing previous scandals). 
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conclusion that people committing the crime of insider trading 
have already achieved relative success, it is important to look at 
why they are willing to commit the crime and put their status and 
wealth at risk.15 
There are many competing theories on why people commit 
crime.16 This note applies the rational choice model of criminal 
causation.17 While many other theories may, in whole or in part, 
explain the behavior of people who commit crime and disassociate 
from society, these theories often fail to explain the behavior of 
people who commit the specific act of insider trading but otherwise 
conform to the law.18 
It has been posited that certain people have an innate 
criminality resulting from biological or physiological 
characteristics.19 Similar to that theory is the claim that criminals 
have a different psychological make-up and possess a sickness, 
mental pathology or personality disorder that causes them to 
repeatedly engage in crime rather than conform to the rules of 
society.20 An innate physical, mental or psychological 
characteristic may explain the actions of those who commit a 
myriad of offenses or dishonest acts throughout their lifetimes, but 
it does not explain those who conform to the law in general, but 
trade on inside information because an opportunity presents 
                                                          
15 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing people who put their 
wealth and status at risk by committing the crime of insider trading). 
16 See, e.g., CLAYTON A. HARTJEN, CRIME AND CRIMINALIZATION 41-51 
(1978) (discussing the different theories of criminal causation as physiological, 
psychological, environmental factors or cost/benefit). 
17 See infra note 24 (discussing rational choice theory). 
18 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the types of relationships 
involved with being an insider). 
19 Id. at 42-44 (discussing the theory that crime is caused by predisposed 
biological factors). This theory has received recent support in the study of 
repetitive antisocial behavior and is better suited to the study of crimes that are 
the result of maladaptive behavior such as violent crimes. Diana H. Fishbein, 
Biological Perspectives in Criminology, in THE CRIMINAL THEORY READER 92-
93 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds., 1998). 
20 See HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing the different theories of 
criminal causation). 
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itself.21 In fact, personality factors that have been associated with 
people that commit insider trading hardly seem to be factors that 
evidence a mental pathology or biological abnormality.22 
Instead, personality factors associated with the crime of insider 
trading often coincide with personality factors that are common to 
people who achieve success.23 A study that examined the influence 
of personality factors on ethical decision-making found a positive 
correlation between insider trading and the factors of 
competitiveness, youth and the male gender.24 Insider trading is a 
crime of opportunity that, unlike other crimes of opportunity25 such 
as stealing cars or embezzlement,26 does not bar the perpetrator 
                                                          
21 Although this note uses the ImClone Scandal to illustrate the rational 
choice involved in the decision to commit the singular crime of insider trading, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that Dr. Waksal, the CEO of ImClone, has 
allegedly committed other infractions throughout his lifetime. See, Geeta Anand, 
In Waksal’s Past: Repeated Ousters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2002, at A-1 
(discussing Dr. Samuel Waksal’s repeated ousters from respected research 
laboratories because of possibility of falsified results and dishonest work 
suggesting a history of nonconformity). Perhaps Waksal’s behavior went 
undeterred because his dishonest means to succeed did in fact conform to 
societal norms. See discussion infra Part II B.1 (discussing the prevalence of 
dishonesty and cheating in American society). 
22 COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 201 (“It is generally agreed that personal 
pathology plays no significant role in the genesis of white collar crime.”). 
23 David E. Terpstra, et al., The Influence of Personality and Demographic 
Variables on Ethical Decisions Related to Insider Trading, 127 J. PSYCHOL. 
375, 385 (1993). 
24 Id. It is also difficult to claim that people commit the act of insider 
trading because they face outside factors such as poverty or other like hardships. 
This would be unlikely because the ability to obtain inside information depends 
on a certain amount of wealth and status. 
25 Rational choice theory argues that criminals weigh the costs and benefits 
of a crime when they are faced with situational factors that present an 
opportunity to commit crime. See Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, 
Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory, 
in THE CRIMINOLOGY READER, 46 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds., 
1998). 
26 Embezzlement is distinguishable from insider trading because although 
both occur in the corporate environment, embezzlement does not possess the 
same legal gray areas as insider trading nor does it possess the social aspect of 
insider trading in which tips are spread among family and friends. 
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from participation in high society.27 Therefore, criminal law 
theories that use biological, psychological or environmental factors 
to understand the commission of crime are not useful to understand 
insider trading. Instead, this note conducts a cost-benefit analysis 
of insider trading.28 
II.  A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading, like other corporate crimes of opportunity, is 
best analyzed through the framework of the classical school of 
criminal law.29 The classical school views the human being as a 
rational decision maker with a free will.30 This framework 
discounts factors such as biological, psychological, or 
environmental abnormalities, which are proposed by competing 
criminal theories.31 Criminal conduct is viewed as a rational choice 
derived through a cost-benefit analysis.32 According to the legal 
theorist Jeremy Bentham, “[n]ature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for 
them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do.”33 Put another way, crime is 
committed when potential benefits outweigh potential costs.34 
                                                          
27 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113-14 (discussing the social and 
employment rewards that may stem from insider trading). 
28 See supra note 25 (describing rational choice theory). 
29 HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 54-55. The classical school employs a 
rational choice theory. Like other crimes of opportunity, insider trading can be 
explained by examining the hypothetical cost-benefit analysis a person would 
engage in before committing the act. 
30 Id. (noting that the classical school of thought developed from judicial 
reform in the eighteenth century Europe). 
31 See supra note 25 (discussing rational choice theory). 
32 Id. 
33 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1979). More primitively, this can be described as a balance 
between pain and pleasure. 
34 HARTJEN, supra note 16, at 42 (relating the degree of punishment to the 
degree of deterrence). Modern criminal law recognizes rational choice theory 
when it attempts to deter potential criminals through the high cost of 
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The benefits of insider trading outweigh the costs for the group 
of people that engage in the behavior. The cost-benefit analysis 
utilized when deciding whether or not to commit a crime is similar 
to that which is used in economic decisions.35 The nonexclusive 
potential benefits associated with insider trading are increased 
wealth, avoidance of loss, possible career growth, social status, and 
maintenance of social relationships.36 The potential costs of insider 
trading on inside information are violation of one’s own moral 
beliefs, violation of social norms, violation of the law, and the 
consequences that follow.37 
A. Potential Benefits 
The benefits of insider trading can be illustrated using the 
ImClone scandal.38 A hypothetical analysis illustrates why the 
members of the ImClone scandal may have committed insider 
trading.39 The facts are alleged as follows: In December of 2001, 
                                                          
imprisonment. Id. This is not to say, however, that deterrence is the only reason 
for imprisonment. Id. See also id. at 54-55 (stating that crime is the result of a 
cost-benefit analysis). 
35 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic and 
Philosophical Perspectives On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1037, 1037-38 (2000) (discussing the similarity between economic and 
legal cost-benefit analysis). 
36 SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113-14. 
37 See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the 
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1839, 1862 (2000) (explaining the normative cost associated with breaking 
the law). See also The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (showing a possibility of 
prison sentence for violating insider trading laws). 
38 See Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Merrill Aide Will Plead Guilty, 
Cooperate on Martha Stewart, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A1 (naming 
players in scandal and their relative positions). See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 
116-22 (discussing common positions held by insider traders). The ImClone 
scandal is a useful example because the alleged participants cover a broad range 
of people likely to trade on inside information: a corporate officer, an 
investment broker, friends, and family. 
39 At this time only Dr. Samuel Waksal, former CEO of ImClone, has pled 
guilty and been sentenced. See Jerry Markon & Geeta Anand, Waksal Pleads 
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before the news was released that the FDA would not review 
ImClone’s application for the new cancer drug Erbitux, former 
ImClone CEO, Dr. Samuel J. Waksal attempted to sell some of his 
shares in his corporation before the announcement caused a 
subsequent fall in price.40 He tipped off family members and close 
friends about the FDA’s decision not to review Erbitux.41 One of 
those friends was Martha Stewart.42 Her Merrill Lynch broker, 
Peter Bacanovic, subsequently sold Stewart’s shares of ImClone.43 
The benefits each alleged inside trader would have gained if 
successful were substantial. With the knowledge that the company 
stock would plummet significantly when the news was released 
about the FDA’s refusal to accept Erbitux,44 the traders would 
avoid substantial pecuniary losses by trading before the 
information was released and the market value of the stock was 
drastically reduced.45 By avoiding the loss, the traders would not 
endanger the social status they enjoyed as wealthy individuals.46 
Peter Bacanovic could have enjoyed potential career advancement 
associated with sharing inside information with an important client 
                                                          
Guilty as U.S. Widens Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2002, at C1, C15. All other 
parties are merely alleged to have traded on inside information. Id. 
40 See Geeta Anand, In Waksal’s Past: Repeated Ousters, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 27, 2002, at A1; Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Merrill Aide Will 
Plead Guilty, Cooperate on Martha Stewart, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A1; 
Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Could be Charged as ‘Tippee,’ WALL ST. J., Oct. 
3, 2002, at A1 (detailing how Martha Stewart was linked to inside information). 
41 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the 
Martha Stewart scandal). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Anand, supra note 21, at A10 (discussing the fact that Erbitux was 
ImClone’s leading prospect and had been responsible for the company’s 
previous success). 
45 Id. at A1 (stating that as of September 26, 2002 ImClone’s stock fell to 
less than nine dollars a share compared with more than seventy-five dollars a 
share preceding the announcement regarding the rejection of Erbitux). 
Hypothetically, if the traders had information that the stock would rebound at a 
later date, they could then buy back their shares at a huge profit. 
46 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing benefits associated with insider 
trading). 
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such as Martha Stewart. Dr. Waksal, by tipping off friends and 
family, would have strengthened his social relationships with 
them.47 
B. Potential Costs 
The most significant costs involved with committing the crime 
of insider trading are the violation of one’s own moral beliefs, 
social norms, and the law.48 To get a complete picture of the costs 
a rational actor would face, it is helpful to evaluate the strength of 
these informal and formal costs individually and then examine the 
strengthening or weakening effect of the costs on each other. 
1. Violation of Moral Beliefs and Social Norms 
Informal costs associated with committing a crime can be both 
internal and external.49 Norms control people’s behavior internally 
by affecting one’s view of oneself as a moral being and externally 
by influencing the way others view their behavior.50 The cost of 
violating a moral belief or social norm is perhaps even more 
influential on behavior than the cost of breaking the law.51 The 
internal cost associated with committing a crime is the violation of 
one’s own moral beliefs.52 This violation reduces the ability to 
view oneself as a moral being.53 Internal costs are closely related to 
external costs because internal morals are often formed from 
                                                          
47 See Markon, supra note 38 (describing Waksal’s crimes). It is the author 
of this note’s conclusion that Waksal received social reinforcement when tipping 
his friends and family members. This conclusion is derived from the fact that 
insider trading may serve as a form of social networking. See SZOCKYJ, supra 
note 11, at 117 (illustrating how insider trading is often committed in a social 
context). 
48 See Robinson, supra note 37 (explaining the costs associated with 
breaking the law). 
49 Id. at 1861 (discussing types of informal costs). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1862. 
53 Id. (noting that people generally want to see themselves as moral beings). 
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external sources.54 An example of this is a child that adopts his 
parent’s view of right and wrong.55 
An external cost of committing a crime is a violation of social 
norms.56 Social norms define the line between socially acceptable 
behavior and unacceptable behavior.57 They create an obligation to 
act or not act in a particular way.58 Costs of violating a social norm 
include a loss of decent public image, employment position and 
social acceptance.59 Howard S. Becker, a distinguished sociologist, 
posited that “[d]eviance is not a quality that lies in behavior itself, 
but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and 
those who respond to it.”60 In other words, it is society’s reaction 
to behavior that acts as a deterrent. In terms of insider trading, it is 
not the actual effect on the market that would deter a potential 
inside trader, but the fact that he or she would be viewed as a 
deviant by society.61 
The costs associated with breaking an internal or external 
norm, whether or not it is also a law, heavily influence an 
individual’s decision to commit a crime.62 A useful explanation of 
this influence is the “Esteem Theory” which states: 
If many people agree that a behavior deserves disapproval, 
if there is an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and 
                                                          
54 See Robinson, supra note 37, at 1862 (stating that people come to hold 
the moral standards with which they are raised as their own). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (describing the power of social norms to deter crime). 
57 RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND 
OPPORTUNITY (1960), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 171 (1979) (noting that norms define what is legitimate behavior 
in society versus what is illegitimate). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (discussing costs that occur even if not arrested for crime). 
60 HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS (1963), reprinted in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, 
CLASSICS OF CRIMINOLOGY 196 (1979). 
61 In applying the above hypothesis to the crime of insider trading the 
assumption is made that societal norms provide deterrence rather than the 
possible bad effects of the crime itself. 
62 Robinson, supra note 37, at 1863 (discussing research that found internal 
and societal control have stronger deterrent effect than legal sanctions). 
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if this agreement and risk are well-known, then the pattern 
of disapproval itself creates the cost to the behavior. When 
sufficiently large, these costs produce a norm against the 
behavior.63 
People conform their behavior to receive positive esteem or avoid 
a negative reaction.64 Therefore, in order to understand whether 
insider trading is sufficiently deterred, it is helpful to ascertain 
whether society disapproves of insider trading, and if so, whether 
there is a well-known risk of detection. 
a.  Is Insider Trading Fair? 
The harm most commonly associated with insider trading is 
that it produces an unfair result.65 The claim that insider trading is 
unfair derives from the belief that trading on inside information 
destroys the integrity of the marketplace by giving an 
informational advantage to a select group of insiders.66 This 
informational advantage harms the outside uninformed investors 
and causes instability in the marketplace.67 The idea that insider 
trading is fundamentally unfair draws on the proposition that all 
investors should have equal access to information and the benefits 
of investing in securities.68 The trader using inside information 
                                                          
63 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997) (discussing the effect that social 
approval or disapproval has on behavior). 
64 Id. at 356. 
65 Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
119, 120 (2002). 
66 See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640. Unlike other corporate crimes, such as 
looting the assets of a company, insider trading, standing alone, affects stock 
price by affecting the supply and demand of the shares rather than removing 
value from the underlying company. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER 
TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 25 (1991) (discussing the effect 
on a company’s shares when a corporate insider trades on nonpublic adverse 
information). 
67 Bach Hang, The SEC’s Criminal Rulemaking in Rule 10B5-2: 
Incarceration Should Be Made of Sterner Stuff, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 633-34 
(2002) (describing insider trading as “fundamentally unfair”). 
68 MACEY, supra note 66, at 28. 
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trades at the wrong price because the price of the security does not 
yet reflect the inside information.69 Likewise, the uninformed 
investor is unable to benefit from the nonpublic information.70 
Thus, the uninformed investor is unable to trust the price of the 
security as reflecting its true value and investor confidence will 
suffer.71 
There some lack of consensus as to whether trading with inside 
information deserves disapproval, however.72 To counter the 
argument that insider trading is unfair and harms outside 
uninformed shareholders, there is an economic argument that 
insider trading helps shareholders both by setting an advantageous 
market price and by transmitting the information into the share 
value.73 The argument claims that insiders benefit shareholders by 
boosting share prices when they trade on information that a 
company is going to have a future gain.74 This boost in price is 
beneficial to outside uninformed shareholders whether they sell at 
the time insiders are buying or if they hold onto their stock and sell 
when the insiders sell.75 Likewise, a shareholder that buys shares 
during the time that insiders are selling in advance of knowledge 
that the company is going to have a future loss is benefited by the 
decreased share price at the time of the buy.76 The buyer, 
                                                          
69 Hang, supra note 67, at 634. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 633. 
72 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: 
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
443, 444 (2001) (discussing the lack of consensus as to why insider trading is 
wrong). See also Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Priniciple in the Law of 
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (1999) (noting that answer to why 
insider trading is wrongful is elusive). Compare MACEY, supra note 66, at 23-24 
(citing Judge Easterbrook’s criticism of the fairness argument as without 
explanation or content) and Hang, supra note 67, at 629, 633-34 (describing 
insider trading as “fundamentally unfair”). 
73 MACEY, supra note 66, at 24. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 25. The argument that the share price will fall as a result of insider 
trading assumes that the insiders are selling a large enough quantity to flood the 
market with shares and therefore lower the share price before the inside 
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hypothetically, would have bought the stock regardless of the 
insider activity and therefore reduces his loss when the stock falls 
because the difference between the buy and sell price is reduced.77 
The uninformed outside trader that does not react to the insider 
activity and merely holds onto his shares is neither helped nor 
harmed by the insider trading.78 
There is also an argument that legalizing insider trading would 
provide benefits for shareholders by lowering the cost of 
management.79 Proponents of legalizing insider trading argue that 
individual companies could decide whether to permit trading on 
their own inside information and even offer it as part of a 
compensation package to managers and directors.80 Allowing 
managers and directors to trade on inside information involves no 
more risk than allowing managers and directors to set their own 
salaries and bonuses.81 In essence, this economic argument not 
only rebuts the claims that trading on inside information is unfair 
and harms the market, but actually proposes that insider trading 
creates a more fair and accurate market by disseminating 
information into the share price more quickly.82 
The argument that insider trading can actually help the market 
conflicts sharply with the idea that insider trading is so unfair that 
                                                          
information becomes public. If the quantity traded by insiders is not sufficient to 
affect the price of the security then the uninformed investor will not be affected. 
Id. (noting that it is the pressure put on the market by the insiders that would 
affect the price). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 MACEY, supra note 66, at 25. 
80 Id. at 28-29 (arguing that including insider trading rights in a 
compensation package would benefit shareholders by lowering managers’ and 
directors’ demands for monetary compensation). 
81 Id. at 30-31. This argument is premised on the argument that managers 
sufficiently motivated by profits to harm shareholders through insider trading 
would also be sufficiently motivated to harm shareholders through demands for 
excessive compensation. Id. 
82 Id. at 24-31. The argument, however, ignores other issues that may make 
regulation of insider trading practical such as the difficulty of deregulated 
monitoring, uneven compliance, and international pressure to regulate global 
markets. 
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it should be punishable by an extended prison sentence.83 
Therefore, because there are such sharply opposed schools of 
thought in the debate of how to treat insider trading, it is unclear 
whether a person weighing the costs associated with insider trading 
would perceive the crime to deserve disapproval from society.84 
b. Is There a Different Set of Norms? 
Furthermore, it is possible that the class of people likely to 
commit insider trading subscribe to a different set of norms.85 The 
potential benefits associated with insider trading signify that 
behavior associated with insider trading may actually be viewed as 
positive among the type of people likely to commit the crime.86 
The example of a corporate director passing along insider stock 
tips to his friends at a golf course illustrates the potential for 
positive social reinforcement for the behavior.87 That director may 
receive positive feedback such as elevated status, gratitude from 
friends or the promise of future inside information from other 
members of his group. A person in this social group is encouraged 
to trade on inside information because of positive social 
                                                          
83 See Hang, supra note 67 (saying that insider trading is “fundamentally 
unfair”). 
84 For the purpose of this note, it is the perception of disapproval that is 
important because it is this perception that will potentially deter the person from 
trading with inside information. If that person is able to justify the act of insider 
trading as fair or as failing to create a true harm, then the cost of violating social 
norms will not be sufficiently high to deter the crime. See discussion infra Part 
III (discussing the power of justification). 
85 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the likelihood that perpetrators 
of insider trading have achieved significant social or monetary success). See also 
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880, 1933-34 (1991) (discussing the difference between middle class and 
the wealthy in relation to public shame). Massaro found that the middle class is 
much more responsive to the threat of public shame than the wealthy because 
they need society’s approval to achieve success, whereas the wealthy are already 
outliers of mainstream society. Id. 
86 See supra Part II.A (discussing the benefits of insider trading). 
87 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11 (discussing the relationships involved in 
insider trading). 
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reinforcement, not dissuaded from the activity because of a fear 
that society would view them as engaging in unfair behavior.88 
An illustration of this type of reinforcement is the insider that 
is immersed in the business world driven by financial gain. In a 
study involving students in various business schools it was 
determined that a person would be likely to commit corporate 
crime if the crime was supported by their corporate environment.89 
This propensity to commit crime was not explained by a feeling of 
invulnerability to legal sanctions, but instead by a feeling that 
behavior was deemed necessary or acceptable by their 
workplace.90 The study found that people were especially likely to 
commit crime for their workplace when the company was doing 
poorly or faced with international competition.91 This may indicate 
that people that trade with inside information may be influenced by 
a different set of social values—the values of their particular social 
group or corporate society. Similarly, an individual may also be 
influenced by the ethics of his profession to commit acts that harm 
the corporation.92 Corporate managers or directors may want to 
match the monetary success of their contemporaries and may put 
their own needs above their duty to the corporation in order to 
achieve exorbitant ends.93 
                                                          
88 See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and 
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 573-74 (1996) (finding that employees are more likely 
to commit crime when it is reinforced by their corporate society). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 574. This propensity to commit crime for the benefit of the 
employer is illustrative of the more relaxed ethical standards of the business 
world. Id. (providing examples of when the business world espouses more 
relaxed ethics). 
91 Id. at 568. 
92 See Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope From Ambition to Greed to 
Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 
889 (2002) (detailing the decline in legal ethics in response to the increase in 
legal earnings). 
93 See Matt Murray, Rachel Emma Silverman, & Carol Hymowitz, GE’s 
Jack Welch Meets His Match in Divorce Court, WALL ST. J, Nov. 27, 2002, at 
A1 (noting that after divorce proceedings revealed exorbitant retirement perks, 
Welch was forced to relinquish 2.5 million to the corporation). This example 
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The low normative cost can also be understood when looking 
at the positive and negative aspects of insider trading in the context 
of American culture as a whole.94 Insider trading is often thought 
of as cheating, unfair and greedy.95 Although none of the above 
named traits sound especially moral or positive, American culture 
does reinforce self-interested, competitive behavior and highly 
values material gain.96 Especially in the business world, unfair and 
greedy behavior is accepted as commonplace.97 Greed has been 
considered so commonplace that “rather than be an aberration, this 
attitude reflects business ethics and practices throughout North 
American history.”98 Cheating, despite its negative connotations, 
                                                          
shows how a member of the business world may be influenced to act against the 
interest of the corporation in contrast to the employee that commits crime for the 
benefit of the corporation. 
94 See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing the values of a 
capitalist society). It is worthwhile to note that other countries with market 
economies also have insider trading, however, many of the other countries do 
not condemn insider trading as much as the American legal system does, and 
some of the countries did not start regulating insider trading until recently under 
pressure from the United States. 
95 See William R. McLucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and 
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 51 BUS. LAW. 1221, 1233 (1996) 
(stating that “insider trading pure and simple, is cheating”); see also Peter M. 
Donnelly, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
and Controlling Person Liability: Can Firms Outside the Securities Industry 
Risk Not to Adopt Insider Trading Safeguard?, 67 U. DET. L. REV 261, 265 
(1990) (finding the unfairness argument to be based on the premise that insider 
trading is cheating). See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing insider trading as 
fundamentally unfair). See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 113 (noting the large 
monetary gains that can result from trading with inside information). It is the 
author of this note’s conclusion that insider trading is perceived as greedy. 
96 COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 203 (“[T]he culture of industrial capitalism 
tends to encourage values, attitudes, and personality structures conducive to 
white collar crime.”). The culture of industrial capitalism encourages people to 
strive for material success of the individual in a highly competitive atmosphere. 
Id. In contrast to a culture that encourages success for the group or sharing of 
wealth, industrial capitalism leads one to act for one’s own benefit potentially at 
the expense of others. Id. 
97 See Paternoster, supra note 88 (giving examples of when corporate 
society encourages crime to get ahead). 
98 THOMAS GABOR, EVERYBODY DOES! CRIME BY THE PUBLIC 116 (1994). 
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may not be a significant enough deviation from normative 
behavior to impose a high enough cost to outweigh the benefits of 
insider trading. 
Although insider trading is labeled unfair, unfairness is actually 
a societal norm.99 A capitalist economy100 values self-interest over 
public interest.101 Although considered to be immoral by some,102 
promotion of self-interest is at the heart of the American economy 
and culture.103 In American culture the individual is placed above 
the group and must be both aggressive and competitive to 
survive.104 Some people have unfair advantages over others 
because American society reflects a huge disparity between the 
wealthy and the poor.105 If one is born with material advantages, 
one can receive a better education, often have better access to 
employment opportunities, and exert more influence over social 
                                                          
99 Although the acceptance of this unfairness maybe grudging in some 
cases, the author posits that unfairness is an inherent characteristic of a capitalist 
society where all people are not economic equals. 
100 Capitalism is defined as “[a]n economic system that depends on the 
private ownership of the means of production and on competitive forces to 
determine what is produced.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (7th ed. 1999). 
Therefore, by definition the American economy encourages a society in which 
individuals compete against each other to increase production and material 
success. See JOYCE KOLKO, AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM 
XIV (1974) (labeling America as capitalist). 
101 IAN TAYLOR, CRIME IN CONTEXT: A CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY OF 
SOCIETIES 64 (1999). 
102 EMILE DURKHEIM, Attachment to Social Groups, in MORAL EDUCATION 
(Everett K. Wilson & Herman Schnurer trans., The Free Press 1961), reprinted 
in JOSEPH E. JACOBY, CLASSICS OF CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1979) (rejecting the 
promotion of self-interest as moral). 
103 GABOR, supra note 98, at 52 (discussing the pursuit of winning and self-
interest as central themes in history). 
104 Id. at 222-23 (describing how American culture influences crime). 
105 See Janet Stidman Eveleth, Growing Up in a Violent and Indifferent 
World: Children Struggle to Survive, 36 JUN MD. B.J. 2, 5-6 (2003) (discussing 
the polarization of American society and the growing disparity between the rich 
and the poor). See also Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: 
Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 287, 287-88 (2000) 
(noting that a market economy produces enormous concentrations of wealth in 
the hands of a few). 
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and political policy.106 
Although cheating has more negative connotations than 
unfairness and is at times considered unacceptable business 
practice, cheating does not have an extremely high moral cost.107 
Cheating can be seen as immoral because it is profiting at the 
expense of other’s moral behavior and gleaning an unfair 
advantage.108 Achieving that unfair advantage in American society, 
however, is not necessarily in violation of social norms.109 
Whether or not cheating truly violates social norms varies along a 
                                                          
106 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 256-57 
(2001) (looking at German and Japanese corporations and stating that “it is not 
the case that all advanced industrial countries treat material wealth as the end, at 
least anywhere near the degree that Americans do.”). Many countries have a 
large disparity between the rich and the poor, though it is arguable that 
American culture is distinguishable from other advanced industrialized countries 
as more individualized and materialistically driven. See COLEMAN, supra note 4, 
at 203 (discussing the values of a capitalist country). Although insider trading 
occurs and is illegal in both Germany and Japan, and although insider trading 
just became illegal in Germany in 1992, neither country punishes insider trading 
with the level of seriousness that the United States does. See Victor F. Calaba, 
The Insiders: A Look at the Comprehensive and Potentially Unnecessary 
Regulatory Approaches to Insider Trading in Germany and the United States, 
Including the SEC’s Newly Effective Rules 10b5-1 and 10B5-2, 23 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 469 (2001) (discussing Germany’s recent 
promulgation of insider trading regulations under pressure to compete with 
foreign markets); Ramnzi Nasser, The Morality of Insider Trading in the United 
States and Abroad, 52 OKLA. L.REV. 377, 381 (1999) (noting that Japan did not 
enact criminal sanctions for insider trading until 1988 despite “rampant” insider 
trading, and also noting that Japan had only sentenced one trader to jail at time 
of article’s publication). It is unclear and a potential area for research to 
determine if this lack of punishment means that insider trading is not as 
disruptive on the Japanese and German markets because of a more responsible 
corporate culture or whether it is just not perceived to be as great a wrong. See 
Calaba, supra; Nasser, supra. 
107 Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: 
Overcriminalization and Moral Content of Regulatory Offense, 46 EMORY L.J. 
1533, 1552 (1997) (categorizing cheating as a prima facie immoral act). This 
note will show that although cheating may be “a prima facie immoral act” it is 
relatively acceptable in our society. 
108 Id. 
109 See supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the norms in American culture). 
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continuum of behavior. At one extreme, cheating in such a way 
that produces a dangerous outcome must be considered wrong.110 
At the other extreme, however, certain forms of cheating are 
considered to be acceptable because the harm is not identifiable or 
the harm is expected.111 
At both extremes the person’s dishonesty is in fact cheating 
another person out of value owed.112 Likewise insider trading 
varies from a small dollar amount with little or no effect on the 
market to a large trade that will drastically affect share prices.113 
Many forms of cheating thus do not have a high normative cost. 
Therefore, at least at the lower end of the continuum, insider 
trading is not in clear violation of societal norms. Insider trading 
can be considered a relatively morally neutral behavior.114 
2.  Interaction between Societal Norms and the Law 
The costs associated with moral belief and societal norms are 
low. It is also probable that much insider trading goes undetected 
                                                          
110 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981) (finding that Ford did not include a bladder in the fuel system that 
could have prevented harm at a cost of four to eight dollars per car to realize a 
savings of 20.9 million dollars). 
111 Examples of cheating that do not have a high normative cost could be 
looking at the answers while completing a puzzle or taking extra “post it” notes 
from the company supply closet. Cf. GABOR, supra note 98, at 57-60 (looking at 
dishonest acts committed by law abiding citizens). 
112 See supra notes 110-11 (giving examples of cheating behavior). 
113 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting the harms caused by insider 
trading). See also SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 59 (quoting a SEC official stating 
that only the larger trades get picked up by surveillance and that only a tiny 
fraction of the smaller illicit trades are caught). 
114 This note argues that although insider trading is considered cheating 
behavior, cheating is in fact considered acceptable in many situations. Green, 
supra note 107, at 1547 (quoting Peter Arenella in defining morally neutral 
conduct as behavior that does not “violate any religious doctrine or community-
based moral norms”). This is a helpful definition of morally neutral behavior 
although Green comes to the conclusion in his article that insider trading does in 
fact violate the community based norm of cheating. Id. 
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because of the secretive nature of the crime.115 The difficulty of 
detection in combination with the fact that insider trading is an ill-
defined offense fail to provide the “well known risk” necessary to 
generate the pattern of disapproval espoused by the “Esteem 
Theory.”116 Therefore, it is likely that despite the great influence 
societal norms have on human behavior, there is not a strong 
normative cost to committing insider trading. 
The amount of influence a norm has on the decision to commit 
a crime can be strengthened or weakened by the law.117 Since this 
analysis has concluded that there is not a sufficiently high 
normative cost, an effective legal cost would be necessary to offset 
the benefits of insider trading.118 The legal consequences for 
                                                          
115 SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 55 (insinuating that although the SEC has 
publicly prosecuted a high profile case they have been unable to detect the 
majority of insider trading). See id. at 59 (noting that SEC is unable to 
proactively detect many of the illicit trades because they are too small to register 
on the surveillance system). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating 
State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1262 (1995) (noting that it is difficult to detect 
when insider trading is taking place, who is making the trades, and if detected it 
is difficult to build a case against the trader); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading Under the Restatement of the Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 29 
(1993) (citing that it has been estimated that one in five cases of insider trading 
is successfully prosecuted and that it is very difficult to tell when insider trading 
is taking place). A contributing factor to the problem of detection may be the 
SEC’s lack of funding. See Peter M.O. Wong, Insider Trading Regulation of 
Law Firms: Expanding ITSFEA’S Policy and Procedures Requirement, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1163 (1993) (citing the SEC’s lack of funding as 
contributing to problems of detection). See also Molly Ivins, Mutual Funds 
Managers Ambush the Middle Class, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at 31 (saying that 
the SEC is underfunded); Craig D. Rose, Only a Few Bad Apples? Despite 
Reforms, Investors Haven’t Seen the Last of Corporate Greed, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., May 4, 2003, at H-1 (noting that the SEC is underfunded and 
understaffed). 
116 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the Esteem 
Theory). 
117 McAdams, supra note 63, at 347 (finding that “(1) sometimes norms 
control individual behavior to the exclusion of the law, (2) sometimes norms and 
law together influence behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence 
each other”). 
118 Robert Cooter, Symposium: Normative Failure of Law, 82 CORNELL L. 
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behavior increase the social view that the behavior is not 
acceptable.119 Social norms can also strengthen or weaken 
compliance with the law.120 If a law is passed expressing values 
that the culture already espouses, then conformity to the law will 
be strengthened. If the legal sanction does not coincide with 
normative values and is not perceived as a sincere risk, however, 
the legal sanction may not be perceived as a high enough cost and 
will have little or no deterrent effect.121 
In theory, criminal law can shape ambiguous social norms by 
highlighting the “wrongfulness of the contemplated conduct,” but 
insider trading has an ambiguous relationship to social norms.122 
The behavior is a form of cheating because it uses an unfair 
advantage at the expense of another.123 Also, the positive value of 
the behavior benefits the individual rather than society.124 
Although, as previously discussed, it may not be at odds with 
American culture, insider trading could be susceptible to being 
constrained by the law.125 Insider trading law, however, is both 
                                                          
REV. 947, 949 (1997) (discussing how the law may impose a beneficial social 
norm). An example of a successful interaction between the law and social norms 
is the laws prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(West 2003) (outlawing employment discrimination based on sex). Another 
commonly discussed example is coinciding legal sanction and social stigma 
associated with perpetrators of racial discrimination. Id. (outlawing employment 
discrimination based on race). In the case of racial discrimination, both the law 
and the society changed over time to outlaw discrimination based on race. Id. 
119 See Cooter, supra note 118 (discussing how the law interacts with 
societal view). 
120 See McAdams, supra note 63 (discussing the relationship between 
social norms and compliance with the law). 
121 Robinson, supra note 37, at 1868 (noting the failure of Prohibition 
laws). 
122 Id. at 1864. 
123 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (labeling insider trading as 
cheating). 
124 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the individual benefits 
associated with insider trading). 
125 See Cooter, supra note 118 (noting how the law may impose a 
beneficial social norm). 
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vague and contradictory.126 The law does not highlight the 
wrongfulness of the behavior because the law does not consistently 
punish those that produce an “unfair”127 result, nor does it punish 
all of the people who knowingly use inside information to their 
advantage.128 It fails to clearly define the offense or to provide 
consistent deterrence for the behavior.129 Therefore, it fails to 
strengthen the normative values or increase the cost of insider 
trading. 
3. Violation of the Law 
Violating the law puts an individual at risk of being arrested, 
prosecuted and convicted.130 Conviction includes the possibility of 
monetary fines or loss of freedom.131 The crime of insider trading 
carries significant civil and criminal penalties.132 These penalties 
have increased overtime presumably with the hope that deterrence 
would increase.133 The high costs of treble damages and the 
possibility of five to ten years in prison should outweigh the 
benefits to insider trading.134 In order to be effective, however, 
legal costs associated with insider trading must be perceived as a 
                                                          
126 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing ambiguity of insider trading law). 
127 See Hang, supra note 67 (describing insider trading as unfair). 
128 See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that 
corporate insiders are permitted to profit from inside information by holding 
onto their shares or tipping others to hold shares, rather than making their 
regular trades, if they have knowledge that prices will increase). 
129 See supra Part II.B.3.a-c (discussing how the law fails to provide a clear 
message as to what constitutes insider trading and why some types of insider 
trading are allowed despite producing the same harms as illegal insider trading). 
130 KADISH, SANFORD H. & STEPHEN J.SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS PROCESSES 2-6 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing criminal justice system). 
131 See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (increasing maximum jail term to 
ten years); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376 98 
Stat. 1264 (1984) (allowing the imposition of treble damages on anyone found 
to have traded on material nonpublic information). 
132 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-243.103 (2000). 
133 See supra note 131 (noting the increased penalties). 
134 See supra Part II.A (describing the benefits of insider trading). 
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real risk and the act of insider trading must be perceived as a true 
crime. 
Unfortunately, the law fails to adequately support the legal 
cost.135 Insider trading is an ambiguous offense that is difficult to 
detect136 and is not actually defined in any legislation.137 The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legislation is often at odds 
with the SEC and offers confusing results.138 Insider trading is 
commonly described as a trade in which “a person, [in breach of 
their duty,] in possession of material nonpublic information about a 
company, trades in the company’s securities and makes a profit or 
avoids a loss.”139 It is often unclear, however, who has a duty, why 
some material nonpublic information is treated differently than 
other material nonpublic information, and why only some people 
who profit from inside information are punishable.140 Although all 
trades using inside information would affect the marketplace and 
the uninformed outside investor in the same way, not all trades 
using inside information are considered illegal.141 This formulation 
of insider trading does not adequately serve to prevent the harm 
caused by insider trading.142 Thus, unpredictable means of 
enforcement do little to provide society with a clear understanding 
                                                          
135 See supra note 131 (describing the legal penalties of insider trading). 
136 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of 
detecting insider trading). 
137 See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (saying that insider trading is not 
actually defined in legislation). 
138 See infra Part II.B.3.a (showing the courts limitations on Rule 10b-5 
liability). 
139 Michael Seitzinger, Federal Securities Law: Insider Trading, 
Congressional Research Service (Jan. 30, 2002), available at 
http://pennyhill.com. 
140 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a-c. 
141 An example of a trade on inside information that is legal would be a 
person with no relationship to the corporation that fortuitously overhears a piece 
of material nonpublic information and buys or sells securities based on that 
information. 
142 See supra Part II.B.1.a and accompanying text (describing the harms 
associated with insider trading as being unfair to outside investors and causing 
instability in the marketplace). 
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the crime of insider trading.143 
The three major rules that are used to prosecute insider trading 
are rule 10b-5,144 rule 16b,145 and rule 14e-3.146 Rule 10b-5, which 
is most commonly used to prosecute insider trading is vague and 
unevenly applied.147 Although section 16b and rule 14e-3 appear 
clear, they are too narrow in scope to address the inadequacy of 
rule 10b-5.148 An analysis of each of the rules reveals the difficulty 
in defining what insider trading is and shows that the law is often 
unable to adequately prevent the harm associated with insider 
trading. 
a.  Rule 10b-5 
Rule10b-5, promulgated under the authority of section 10(b) 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,149 does not even use the term 
insider trading.150 Instead the language used to prosecute insider 
                                                          
143 See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that a crime must be a well defined risk to 
deter a rational actor in their cost-benefit analysis). 
144 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) (finding it unlawful to “engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security”). 
145 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2003) (finding that it any short swing profit by 
an insider “shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any 
intention on the part of the beneficial owner, director or officer . . .”). 
146 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2003) (stating that to trade on inside 
information with respect to a tender offer “shall constitute a fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative act . . .”). 
147 See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (stating that insider trading is not 
defined in legislation and that the law has failed to develop systematically or 
provide bright line rules). 
148 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.b-c (discussing the inadequacy of 
section 16b and rule14e-3). 
149 Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 says in 
relevant part that it shall be unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003). 
150 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
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trading is that it is illegal to knowingly “engage in any act, 
practice, or course of behavior which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.”151 Since rule10b-5 does not actually define 
the crime of insider trading, the courts have interpreted the rule in 
a way that is often confusing in application.152 
The evolution of the duty element of 10b-5 liability illustrates 
the inconsistent application of rule 10b-5 to prevent the harm 
caused by insider trading. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC 
determined that rule 10b-5 mandated that corporate insiders have a 
duty to either abstain from trading on material inside information 
or disclose the inside information prior to trading.153 Since Cady, 
Roberts, & Co., the Supreme Court has further interpreted the duty 
element to scale back the broad reach of rule 10b-5. In Chiarella v. 
United States, the Supreme Court exposed the inconsistent 
application of insider trading laws when it overturned the SEC 
conviction of a financial printer employee who traded on 
                                                          
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
151 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
152 See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 640 (stating that “the law [with regard to 
insider trading] has not developed systematically nor has it evolved in such a 
way to produce bright-line tests of when it is permissible to trade”). 
153 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 69638, at *3 (S.E.C. Release No. 
34-6668) (stating that corporate insiders owe a duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading on inside information). See also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
651-52 (1997) (discussing that under the classical theory of 10(b) liability the 
duty derived from the relationship of trust and confidence between the insider of 
a corporation and the shareholders of a corporation). This duty has since been 
extended to include the source of the information that has been misappropriated. 
Id. at 653 (adopting the misappropriation theory). 
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confidential information regarding tender offers.154 The Supreme 
Court held that the printer did not have a duty to disclose, prior to 
the trade, the information he traded on under rule 10b-5 and 
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.155 This 
was because the printer owed no duty to the corporation or its 
shareholders.156 
Again in 1983, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for 
insider trading using rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) when it found 
there was no requisite breach of duty in United States v. Dirks.157 
In Dirks, a broker, that was tipped by a corporate insider that the 
corporation had been engaging in fraudulent behavior, selectively 
disclosed that information to his clients, who were in turn able to 
avoid significant loss.158 The Court found, however, that because 
the corporate insider did not gain a personal benefit when he tipped 
Mr. Dirks there was no requisite breach of duty.159 Although not 
typical insiders, such as a director or officer, who owe a duty of 
disclosure to a corporation,160 both Chiarella and Dirks knowingly 
subjected the market to the potential adverse effects of insider 
trading.161 Both men took advantage of access to nonpublic inside 
information through their positions of employment.162 Both men 
                                                          
154 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
155 Id. at 232. A tender offer is “[a] public announcement by a company . . . 
that it will pay a price above the current market price for shares ‘tendered’ of a 
company it wishes to acquire control of.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1468 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
156 Id. 
157 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
158 Id. at 648-49. 
159 Id. at 665-66. 
160 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 69638 at *3 (finding that corporate 
insiders owe a duty to disclose or abstain from trading with inside information). 
See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28 (citing Cady and noting that although 
insiders owe a duty to the corporation through their employment, Chiarella was 
not under a duty to disclose his misuse of information). 
161 Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. Chiarella directed traded 
securities with inside knowledge regarding a tender offer while Dirks passed the 
inside information onto his clients who then trade on the information. Chiarella, 
445 U.S. at 222. 
162 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651 (finding that Dirks passed the inside 
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also had an unfair advantage over outside uninformed traders. Yet, 
neither one was ultimately found guilty of insider trading.163 
In response to the gray areas illustrated in the duty analysis of 
Chiarella and Dirks, the Supreme Court adopted the 
misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan.164 O’Hagan 
defined the misappropriation theory as holding that “a person 
commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and 
thereby violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”165 The misappropriation theory broadened the duty 
requirement under rule 10b-5 and imposed a fiduciary duty on 
investors who trade with inside information to the source of the 
information.166 The misappropriation theory reaches people who 
under previous law would be exempt from liability because they 
did not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and the 
corporation’s shareholders.167 
The SEC has since supplemented the misappropriation theory 
with the promulgation of rule 10b5-2 which defines three 
situations in which a person owes a duty of trust or confidence.168 
                                                          
information through his position as a broker); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222 
(finding that Chiarella learned of the inside information through his position as a 
printer). 
163 See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222. 
164 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (finding that lawyer owed no duty to 
corporation but owed duty to law firm who worked with corporation and 
simultaneously holding that the SEC did not exceed rule making authority in 
rule 14e-3 and adopting the misappropriation theory). 
165 Id. at 652. 
166 Id. (stating that information is misappropriated when there is a breach of 
duty to the source of information). 
167 See Lee, supra note 65, at 128 (noting that the property approach of the 
misappropriation theory did not displace duty analysis, but rather extended the 
reach of the securities laws). 
168 Section 10(b)5-2 states in relevant part that a person owes a duty of trust 
or confidence: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic 
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, 
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The three situations focus on a duty to keep a confidence either 
through a work relationship, past dealings or familial relations.169 
The facts in O’Hagan, a case in which a partner at a law firm 
traded on inside information regarding an upcoming tender offer 
from one of the firm’s clients, clearly fit into one of these 
categories.170 O’Hagan owed a duty of trust and confidence under 
the misappropriation theory because of the confidence required 
between a lawyer, the firm at which he is employed and the 
client.171 The misappropriation theory does not, however, succeed 
fully in clarifying the law of insider trading because there are many 
situations when the duty imposed by the misappropriation theory is 
either unclear or insufficient.172 
Applying the misappropriation theory to the ImClone scandal, 
it is unclear whether all the actors will be found to have a duty.173 
                                                          
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the 
information knows or reasonably should know that the person 
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the 
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person 
receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his spouse, 
parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or 
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or 
confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that 
he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known  that the 
person who was the source of the information expected that the person 
would keep the information confidential, because of the parties’ 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and 
because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)5-2 (2001). 
169 Id. It is possible that an employment contract with Merrill Lynch may 
include some confidentiality agreement. This agreement would make it easier to 
claim that Bacanovic owed a duty to Merrill Lynch. Id. 
170 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647-48. 
171 Id. at 653. 
172 An example of this would be a live-in partner that does not quite fit the 
“familial category” or past dealings with counselor that does not impose the 
same type of professional duty to keep a confidence to their clients as a 
psychiatrist. 
173 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the 
ImClone scandal). 
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Dr. Waksal, the CEO of Imclone, had a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation and shareholders so it is unnecessary to further 
evaluate his behavior under the misappropriation theory.174 Peter 
Bacanovic,175 the Merrill Lynch broker, could be found to have 
owed a duty to Merrill Lynch under “a shared history, pattern or 
practice of sharing confidences”176 or even under his employment 
contract.177 Martha Stewart, however, would be difficult to fit 
within one of the categories unless it could be shown that her past 
dealings with Waksal showed a pattern of shared confidences or 
that she knew that Bacanovic was in breach of his duties when he 
advised her to sell her shares.178 If Martha Stewart had a familial 
                                                          
174 Dr. Waksal would also have a duty under traditional 10b-5 analysis 
because he was the CEO of ImClone and owed the corporation a fiduciary duty. 
See supra note 153(noting the duty analysis introduced in In re Cady). 
175 Peter Bacanovic may have a duty under traditional analysis without the 
necessity of the misappropriation theory. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646. It would be, 
however, difficult to prove because under Dirks the court held that breach of 
duty required a benefit to the trader. Id. (finding broker did not breach a duty 
because he did not financially benefit when he tipped his customers). If 
Bacanovic was only executing Martha Stewart’s order and not trading for his 
own benefit, it would be a harder case. See supra note 159 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Dirks duty analysis). 
176 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(2) (2001). 
177 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(1) (2001). 
178 It is important to note that Martha Stewart could still be subject to 10b-5 
under traditional analysis. She would be, however, subject to duty analysis under 
Chiarella and Dirks, which would require a finding that Dr. Waksal was in 
breach of his duty to ImClone that he benefited from this breach and that she 
knew he was in breach of his duty. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying 
text (discussing the difficulties with duty analysis under Chiarella and Dirks). 
Reflecting the difficulty in prosecuting insider trading cases Martha Stewart has 
not been indicted for criminal insider trading charges. Colleen Debaise, Stewart 
Seeks Dismissal of Charges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at C12 (citing that 
although the government investigated Martha Stewart’s trading activity, the 
indictment did not reflect an insider trading indictment). It is necessary to note 
that the SEC has filed civil insider trading charges. Id. This indictment, 
however, has been criticized. See Warren L. Dennis and Bruce Boyden, Stewart 
Prosecution Imperils Business Civil Liberties, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 2, 
2003, available at http://www. marthatalks.com (referring to the indictment as 
“an unprecedented and unanticipated expansion of insider trading theory, one 
that gives every indication of having been crafted to snare Stewart rather than 
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relation to Waksal or Bacanovic, she would be easier to 
prosecute.179 This is an arbitrary distinction. The proposed harm of 
insider trading, disruption of market confidence and unfair trade 
practices180 is not lessened because the person trading on inside 
information is unrelated to the source. Therefore, as illustrated by 
this one example, the misappropriation theory is also under-
inclusive in application. 
b.  Section 16(b) 
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act prohibits 
corporate insiders from profiting on short swing trades.181 It only 
applies to a limited class of people, however, and only prohibits 
active trades.182 The rule considers all trades to be illegal within a 
period of less than six months to be insider trading unless there is a 
previously written schedule of trades.183 Section 16(b) does not 
have a scienter requirement like rule 10b-5 because it states that 
the profit shall inure and be recoverable “irrespective of any 
intention on the party of such beneficial owner, director, or 
                                                          
close an important interstice in the law”). 
179 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)-2(3) (2001) (listing familial relationship as one 
that will be presumed to encompass a duty of confidence). 
180 See supra Part II.B.a (discussing the harms associated with insider 
trading). 
181 15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b) (2002). Section 16(b) provides that: 
For the purposes of preventing unfair use of information which may 
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by 
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from 
any purchase or sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of 
issuer (other than an exempted security) or a security-based swap 
agreement . . . involving any such equity security within any period of 
less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, 
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, 
director, or officer . . . . 
Id. 
182 Id. (applying to the “beneficial owner, director, or officer” and to the 
“purchase and sale” or sale and purchase” of securities). 
183 Id. 
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officer.”184 It is too narrow in scope, however, to close the gaps in 
enforcement left open by rule 10b-5.185 The application of section 
16(b) is inconsistent when compared to the harms it is designed to 
prevent because of its requirement that the insider must actively 
trade to commit the offense.186 Therefore, the insider, who has a 
permissible schedule of trades, may decide to hold his shares based 
on material nonpublic information. Likewise the insider could tip 
his friends and family to hold their shares in advance of an 
upcoming event that will increase the price of the shares.187 The 
insider, therefore, has an unfair advantage over the outside 
uninformed investor and knowingly uses inside information to 
dictate market activity. Nonetheless, he would not violate section 
16(b) because he did not actively trade on his inside 
information.188 
c.  Rule 14e-3 
The enactment of rule 14e-3189 under the statutory authority to 
                                                          
184 15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b). Scienter is required because rule 10b-5 invokes 
the common law doctrine of fraud rather than actually define expressly address 
insider trading. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). The relevant portion states that it 
is illegal “to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.” Id. (emphasis added). 
185 See supra note 150 (applying to active purchase or sale of a security and 
limiting violation to a distinct group of people). 
186 Id. The language of the statute specifies “a purchase or sale of a security 
of an issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b). 
187 Rather than incidentally profiting with the rise of the shares or selling 
early and missing out on the rise of the shares like outside investors, the insiders 
and their respective tippees could have an advance notice of the event and hold 
their shares accordingly. An example of this would be a corporate director that 
regularly sells 1000 shares every year and decided not to sell until the resulting 
increase in share value after receiving inside information of a profitable business 
venture. 
188 15 U.S.C. § 16 78p(b) (2002). 
189 Rule 14e-3 provides that transactions in securities on the basis of 
material, nonpublic information in the context of tender offers satisfy the 
requirements of the offense of insider trading: 
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regulate tender offers190 in the 1980s attempted to close the gap 
between what was legal versus illegal insider trading.191 Rule 14e-
3 eliminates the need for a breach of fiduciary duty when trading 
                                                          
(a) [i]f any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or 
has commenced a tender offer (the ‘offering person’), it shall constitute 
a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the 
meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in 
possession of material information relating to such tender offer which 
information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he 
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly 
from: (1) The offering person (2) The issuer of the securities sought or 
to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner 
or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person 
or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any 
of such securities or any securities convertible into exchangeable for 
any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any 
of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any 
purchase or sale of such information and its source are publicly 
disclosed by press release or otherwise. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002). 
190 Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC 
the authority by providing: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any 
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of 
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request 
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purpose of this subsection, 
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably 
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative. 
15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e). In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court ruled that the SEC did not 
exceed this authority in the promulgation of rule 14e-3. United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 674 (1997). 
191 O’Hagan did this by extending the duty analysis to include an 
employee’s duty to their employer. This expansion of duty dealt with the 
previous problem exposed in Chiarella v. United States in which a printer 
employee who traded on inside information was held not to have a duty to 
stockholders under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 445 
U.S. 222 (1980). 
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material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer.192 Rule 
14e-3 makes it “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or 
practice” to engage in the trade of material, nonpublic information 
in relation to a tender offer without proof of any fiduciary duty.193 
Although this rule appears to capture most situations involved in 
trading on material nonpublic information during a tender offer, it 
fails to explain why information regarding tender offers is worthy 
of more legal attention than other types of corporate inside 
information that could have a volatile effect on the stock market.194 
Although probably a reaction to the prevalence of takeovers 
and tender offers in the 1980s,195 the discrepancy between the 
specificity of Rule 14e-3 and a catch-all rule such as 10b-5 is 
troubling.196 Using the example of the ImClone scandal, a tippee 
such as Martha Stewart who allegedly received material nonpublic 
information through someone she knew to be a corporate officer 
will be more difficult to prosecute because the information was in 
relation to the FDA examination of Erbitux rather than a tender 
offer.197 If the information Martha Stewart had allegedly traded on 
were in relation to a tender offer, she would clearly fall under the 
purview of the rule. But because it was not in relation to a tender 
offer and therefore must be analyzed under traditional 10b-5 
liability, it is necessary to prove a duty.198 This distinction is 
                                                          
192 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002). 
193 Id. 
194 For example, news that a corporation is going to be facing expensive 
litigation, or that an overstatement of assets is about to be exposed could also 
have a dramatic effect on a stock’s market value. 
195 See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 480 (stating that a new type of financing 
that first became available in the 1980’s became a very common method for 
takeovers). 
196 Rule 10(b)(5)(c) merely provides in relevant part “to engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). See supra note 150. 
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002) (extending duty only in relation to a 
tender offer). 
198 See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing the duty requirement under 10b-5). 
See also Jerry Markon, Martha Stewart Could be Charged as ‘Tippee,’ WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at C1 (stating that “[t]ypically, insider-trading cases are 
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illogical because, for example, in the particular situation involving 
ImClone, the effect of the success or failure of the cancer drug 
Erbitux on the stock price of ImClone is comparable to the effect 
of information regarding a tender offer.199 
Rule 14e-3 also fails to resolve the discrepancy between a 
person who uses the inside information with knowledge of the 
source and a person who comes across the information 
fortuitously.200 This is because rule 14 e-3 states that the trade: 
shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act 
or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act 
for any person who is in possession of material information 
relating to such tender offer which information he knows or 
has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has 
reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly 
from: (1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the 
securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) 
Any officer, director, partner or employer or any other 
person acting on behalf of the offering person.201 
This distinction may have roots in the principle that a person must 
have a sufficient mens rea to commit a crime, but it does little to 
justify the fact that both situations will have an identical effect on 
the market. Therefore, although Rule 14e-3 is both highly specific 
as to what constitutes an offense in relation to tender offers and 
encompasses traders with and without a traditional duty, it is still 
under inclusive and inadequate in relation to the enforcement of a 
ban on insider trading as a whole.202 Rule 14e-3 fails to fully 
                                                          
brought against individuals who had knowledge and traded on market-moving 
information—about an impending merger or a decline in earnings, for 
example—before it is publicly announced. Thus, any insider-trading case 
against Ms. Stewart could be more difficult to win than a traditional case”). 
199 See Anand, supra note 21 (noting the huge impact Erbitux had on the 
value of ImClone). 
200 An example of a person who receives the information without 
knowledge would be someone who overhears a conversation or receives the 
information from an acquaintance without realizing that it is nonpublic. 
201 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(3) (2002). 
202 See id. (applying only in relation to a tender offer when someone 
violates the provision with intent). 
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address the harms caused by insider trading because it punishes 
some people who trade on inside information, potentially harm 
small investors and create instability in the market, but benefits 
those that create the same effect yet do not fit into the necessary 
categories.203 
The result of the ambiguity of what constitutes illegal insider 
trading and the laws inability to adequately address the harms 
lower the effectiveness of a legal cost for the behavior. Rather than 
resolving the ambiguity a potential inside trader may face as to the 
wrongfulness of the action, the law exacerbates the problem. Like 
a child that is inconsistently disciplined without logical 
explanation, the potential trader is not deterred from engaging in 
the behavior. 
C. Justification of Trading on Inside Information 
Even if a potential trader of inside information perceives the 
potential normative and legal costs of insider trading, that trader 
can justify the behavior. Justification can ameliorate the guilt that a 
generally law-abiding citizen feels when breaking the law.204 
Rather than giving up the potential benefits of the crime, they can 
still “derive . . . personal benefit by going through with the act . . . 
strip[ping] it of its negative connotation by casting it into a 
positive, or at least acceptable, light.”205 Sociologists Sykes and 
Matza identified five common types of justification: denial of 
injury, denial of victim, denial of responsibility, appeal to higher 
loyalties and condemning the condemner.206 Most relevant to a 
discussion of insider trading are the denials of injury, victims, and 
responsibility. Thus, even though a person is aware that trading 
with inside information is against the law and that society views 
people that commit the crime as greedy and cheating, they may 
                                                          
203 Id. 
204 See supra Part II.B (discussing the internal costs associated with 
breaking the law). 
205 GABOR, supra note 98, at 186. 
206 SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 104 (discussing Sykes and Matza’s theory of 
neutralization which explains the techniques that offenders employ to retain 
their positive self-image while breaking the law). 
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deny that they are actually doing anything wrong.207 
Justification of law-breaking behavior is very common, 
especially among people who view themselves as law abiding.208 
People often commit small acts of theft without categorizing them 
as stealing or may cheat on their taxes because they feel that the 
government does not have a rightful claim on their earnings.209 
People may rationalize insider trading by viewing it as a 
“victimless” crime because they are not harming a specific person 
but a corporation or the market in general.210 The victim of insider 
trading, presumably the market and the uninformed shareholder, is 
amorphous and difficult to conceptualize.211 If the victim is 
acknowledged, then the victim, like the government in the tax 
scenario, may not be sufficiently sympathetic.212 
It is also relatively easy to deny that the trader is committing 
any actual harm. Not only is the offense poorly defined, leaving 
the perpetrator to question whether his conduct falls under the 
confines of the law, but many scholars argue that the insider 
trading helps rather than hurts the market.213 A person, therefore, 
could reasonably justify an act of insider trading as not hurting 
anyone or not being a crime at all. Someone who could be liable 
under the misappropriation theory may have merely passed on the 
information rather than committed the trade.214 That person may 
                                                          
207 See supra Part II.B (discussing the costs associated with insider trading). 
208 GABOR, supra note 98, at 186. 
209 Id. at 73-74 (describing common theft situations such as stealing a 
grocery cart from the supermarket, towels from a hotel, and menus from a 
restaurant). 
210 See SZOCKYJ, supra note 11, at 104 (discussing denial of victim as a 
powerful justification). 
211 See Hang, supra note 67(describing the victim as the uninformed 
shareholder). 
212 Id. at 189 (discussing a robber who claimed he only robbed people who 
could afford it). But see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing 
the argument that insider trading is fundamentally unfair and highlighting the 
injury to outside uninformed investors). 
213 See MACEY, supra note 66, at 25-28 (discussing the relationship 
between insider trading and the shareholder’s welfare). 
214 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that a 
person may be liable for insider trading under the misappropriation theory when 
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justify their actions by denying responsibility of insider trading 
because the actual trade rather than the mere transfer of 
information causes the harm. 
The power of justifications is enormous. Every time a person 
fails to come to a complete stop at a stop sign when driving in the 
middle of the night because “they aren’t going to hurt anyone” or 
refills a drink at a restaurant without paying because “the 
restaurant charges too much for soda anyway,” the person is 
employing justifications to rationalize breaking the law. Therefore, 
the ability to justify insider trading lowers the incentive to comply 
with the law.215 
III.  A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
The decision to commit the crime of insider trading is a 
rational one because the costs a person risks when trading illegally 
on material nonpublic information are outweighed by potential 
benefits and available justifications. It is likely that successful 
people, such as Martha Stewart, will continue to risk losing wealth 
and social status and face the possibility of jail time in order to 
potentially protect assets and increase wealth and social status.216 
                                                          
“a person commits fraud in ‘connection with a securities transaction’, and 
thereby violates §10(b) and Rule10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information”). This means that a person who passes inside 
information to another person, without personal benefit, in breach of a duty to 
the source and the latter person trades on that information, the former could be 
held liable under the misappropriation theory. See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 580 
(explaining the ruling in O’Hagan). If the tippee is found to owe a duty to the 
source of the information, such as a duty to their employer or spouse, then the 
misappropriation theory will apply. Id. at 655 (discussing how a tippee could 
have a duty under the misappropriation theory). However, if the tippee does not 
owe a duty of confidence to the source of the information than Dirks and 
Chiarella duty analysis will apply. Id. at 653 (giving examples where the 
misappropriation theory will not apply). 
215 See GABOR, supra note 98, at 186 (discussing the power of 
justification). 
216 See supra Part II (concluding that the costs associated with insider 
trading do not outweigh the benefits). 
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In order to more effectively deter this type of decision, the law 
must be strengthened to override the normative structure of 
society. 
The law can override the high informal benefits and low 
informal costs.217 If insider trading is a behavior that the country 
wants to prevent, then it must be viewed as wrongful. That view 
must be supported through consistent legal deterrence. If, in fact, 
insider trading has a negative effect on the markets and is actually 
                                                          
217 There are other potential solutions. For example an adjustment of the 
informal costs and benefits associated with insider trading would influence the 
level of normative deterrence felt by those that illegally trade on inside 
information. This would be difficult, however because many of the norms that 
reinforce insider trading also coincide with the countries economic structure. See 
supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the way the norms in a capitalist society such as 
the United States may fail to adequately deter insider trading). Another potential 
solution is to conform the law to the ambivalent societal norms and legalize 
insider trading. It is argued that insider trading could be controlled through a 
deregulated scheme by the owners of information themselves, namely the 
corporations. MACEY, supra note 66, at 28. In this scenario, corporations could 
decide whether to allow insiders to trade on their information in lieu of other 
benefits such as compensation and regulate those that breached a company wide 
ban by monitoring and threat of potential loss of employment. Id. Although this 
solution is plausible, this possibility is also unlikely because insider trading has 
been consistently regulated since the 1930’s following the Depression. NASSER 
ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
INSIDER TRADING THEORY AND EVIDENCE 19 (1993) (discussing the history of 
insider trading regulation). The legalization of insider trading is also unlikely 
because, although not as strictly policed, much of the international community 
has stepped up their insider trading regulations to keep pace with the United 
States. See Calabra, supra note 106, at 469 (saying that Germany made insider 
trading illegal in 1994 to remain competitive in the international market); see 
also Nasser, supra note 106, at 377 (stating that although insider trading is 
illegal in Canada and Japan it is not punished as severely and that Japan did not 
consider insider trading punishable by imprisonment until 1997). There has also 
been a European Community Directive issued which proscribes a minimum 
uniform standard of legislation for all members to regulate insider trading. 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Defining Illegal Trading—Lessons from the European 
Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 236 
(1992) (discussing the implementation in 1989 of the European Community 
Directive that defines insider trading based on trading while in possession of 
information). Therefore, in today’s fluid global market it would be difficult for 
the United States to deregulate insider trading at this time. 
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fundamentally unfair, then all insider trading should be deemed 
wrongful.218 Like other legally wrongful behavior, unintentional 
trading need not be punished.219 A clear definition of the offense 
and consistent application is necessary for sufficient deterrence. If 
the law is to effectively deter insider trading, the law must work to 
strengthen weak normative costs associated with insider trading 
and raise a barrier against effective use of justifications. 
This cannot be accomplished by a mere increase in 
sanctions.220 A clear definition is necessary to allow the costs of 
insider trading to outweigh the benefits. It must be clear to a 
potential perpetrator that they will actually be committing illegal 
insider trading. Although not perfect, the directive issued by the 
European Community is a good example.221 Rather than regulating 
insider trading under a catchall fraud statute such as 10(b), the 
directive clearly defines insider trading without a duty 
requirement.222 The directive prohibits trading with the possession 
                                                          
218 See Hang, supra note 67 (discussing the fairness argument of insider 
trading). 
219 See KADISH, supra note 130, at 203 (discussing the concern of a 
perpetrator’s mental state when punishing criminal behavior). For example, if 
the mens rea requirement was abandoned, then an outside investor could trade 
on inside information he reasonably believed to be public and inadvertently 
commit a crime. 
220 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting the increase in legal 
sanctions in 1984 and 1988; a failed response to insider trading scandals of the 
1980’s). 
221 See Hazen, supra note 221 (noting the implementation of the European 
Community Directive on Insider Trading). 
222 The Council Directive 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
Dealing, defines the both inside information and the people who will be held 
liable for trading with it: 
‘inside information’ shall mean information which has not been made 
public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of 
transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant 
effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in question. 
2. ‘transferable securities’ shall mean:(a) shares and debt securities, as 
well as securities equivalent to shares and debt securities; (b) contracts 
or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in 
(a); (c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect of 
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of material nonpublic knowledge.223 The duty requirement in 
current American legislation is especially problematic as illustrated 
by Chiarella and Dirks and has not been completely solved by the 
misappropriation theory.224 The directive does not resolve all 
ambiguities regarding insider trading, but is a good example of 
legislation that offers a clear definition of insider trading.225 
Not only does the offense have to be clearly defined, but it also 
has to be perceived as wrong. The law must compensate for the 
weak societal deterrence of insider trading. A potential way to 
increase the perception of wrongfulness would be to transfer the 
legislation used to prosecute insider trading from the SEC’s 
                                                          
securities referred to in (a); (d) index contracts in respect of securities 
referred to in (a), when admitted to trading on a market which is 
regulated and supervised by authorities recognized by public bodies, 
operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public. 
Article 2. 1. Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: by 
virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital 
of the issuer, or because he has access to such information by virtue of 
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses inside 
information from taking advantage of that information with full 
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account 
or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, 
transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information 
relates. 2. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or 
other type of legal person, the prohibition laid down in that paragraph 
shall apply to the natural persons who take part in the decision to carry 
out the transaction for the account of the legal person concerned. 3. The 
prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply to any acquisition or 
disposal of transferable securities effected through a professional 
intermediary. 
1989, O.J. (L334) 30. 
223 Id. 
224 United States v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (finding that a broker did 
not breach a duty because he did not gain a financial benefit when tipping his 
customers inside information); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) 
(finding that a printer did not owe shareholders a duty when he traded on inside 
information). See supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing the difficulty of applying the 
misappropriation theory and finding it is unclear who it will reach). 
225 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. For example, a person must 
still actively trade with inside information. Id. 
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administrative regulations, incorporating insider trading into 
federal criminal law.226 It is necessary to clearly provide what state 
of mind is required as well as what specific acts are required to 
commit the offense. A lower mens rea, such as negligence, would 
widen the scope of insider trading laws.227 The law should also 
address all illegal use of insider information rather than just 
punishing those that actually purchase or sell securities.228 An 
insider that holds while using inside information is gaining the 
same unfair advantage against the uninformed investor as the 
insider that actively trades.229 The law needs to adequately address 
the harm it seeks to prevent.230 It must be exceptionally clear and 
consistent because the prohibition of insider trading it does not 
necessarily coincide with the norms in this country.231 Although 
strengthening insider trading legislation is the most likely solution, 
the decision to trade on inside information, in American culture, is 
one that must be made more difficult if criminalization of insider 
trading is to be made effective. 
                                                          
226 It is necessary that regulation of insider trading remain on the federal 
level rather than the state level because of the fluidity of the market across state 
lines. Although criminal law is generally the responsibility of the states, in this 
case the federal government has authority to regulate insider trading under the 
commerce clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also William Brian 
Gaddy, A Review of Constitutional Principals to Limit the Reach of Federal 
Criminal Statutes, 67 UMKC L. REV. 209, 210 (1999). 
227 For example a mens rea requirement of negligence would address the 
trader that overhears inside information and trades on it without determining 
whether the information is public or not. Negligence is defined as “the omission 
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary 
considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing 
of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990). 
228 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and 
insider could achieve by holding his shares based on inside information). 
229 Id. 
230 The harm most commonly associated with insider trading is that it is 
unfair to uninformed investors and causes instability in the marketplace. See 
discussion supra Part II.B.1.a. 
231 See supra Part II.B.1.b (finding that normative costs do not adequately 
deter insider trading). 
MALONE1.DOC 3/3/2004  1:50 PM 
368 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
CONCLUSION 
A person faced with the rational choice of whether or not to 
trade on inside information will confront many potential costs and 
benefits. Many potential perpetrators will find that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. In addition, they can justify this criminal 
behavior. With the current state of the law, it is not surprising that 
a person with significant wealth and/or social status, such as 
Martha Stewart, would risk the penalties of insider trading at the 
possibility of achieving the benefits. In order to curb the problem 
insider trading the potential costs must be clearly perceived and 
increased. Therefore, the crime of insider trading should be more 
clearly defined in legislation and more consistently applied in 
order to compensate for weak informal costs. 
 
